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Philosophical Conceptions and Representations of the Feminine: Contributions Towards a 




Drawing upon an extensive bibliography concerning the role of women in Western culture, this 
article aims to deconstruct the common idea that male domination was always peacefully and 
universally accepted. Thus, it calls attention to the fact that in Greece (where our tradition 
conceptually originated), parallel to the established canon of thought, there were significant 
disruptions revealing other ways of conceiving and representing the feminine, thereby 
demonstrating the need to re-signify our reception of the classical tradition.  
Keywords: feminism; philosophy; women; classical tradition.  
 
 
What is desirable must become possible. 
Adela Cortina 
 




This te t d a s upo  A istotle s lai  that ei g is said i  a  a s,  and that, moreover, 
and perhaps more importantly, that it is said by a polyphony of voices, some near and 
harmonious, others far-off and dissonant, but all equally essential. Indeed, the notion that all 
voices are indispensable to make sense of reality underpins my argument throughout, 
inspired by Paul Ri oeu s o se atio  that the he e euti  field is o stituti el  
fragmented and therefore impossible to mediate properly, with the result that human 
rationality is condemned to a conflict of interpretations which represents the last frontier of 
a finite and merely human rationality.  
Thus, in the light of this, I acknowledge that the writing of this text, like any other, takes 
place on the horizon of a dialectique à synthèse ajournée – in other words, that it is indebted 
to many other texts; that writing is, in its essence, intertextual; that the textual fabric 
produced is by nature unfinished, and that there will be other texts that will oppose mine 
and give rise to new texts, enabling the sum of them all to achieve a deeper, truer and more 
enlightened vision of reality.  
The aim of this article is to study the connection between philosophical thought and the 
conceptualization of the feminine, focusing upon certain aspects of that relationship in 
                                                 
* Article published in RCCS 89 (June 2010). 
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Greek culture at the moment philosophy made its appearance. This does not derive from 
any historicist bias towards beginning at the beginning, but rather from the recognition that, 
in the so-called Western world, Ancient Greece represented a founding moment and, within 
the sphere of philosophy, it instituted a different way of thinking, opening up a whole new 
theoretical space, irrespective of how the passage from mythos to logos is interpreted.  
In this case, with regard to philosophical conceptions and representations of the 
feminine, it seems indisputable that we received from Greece a foundational 
anthropological discrimination, a kind of archetypal stereotype, which caused the feminine 
to be perceived as derivative, and women to be considered the second sex throughout the 
Western tradition. But it seems equally indisputable that there was also another 
conceptualization of women and the feminine in Greece, associated with strength, courage 
and conviction, as in the case of Antigone or the philosopher queens suggested by Plato in 
his Republic. In such a context, it does not seem likely that in Greece women were confined 
exclusively to the gynaeceum, that they could not enter public life (with the exception of 
some religious festivals), and had a status conceptually similar to that of slaves and children; 
for, although those things did occur, there seem also to have been other occurrences that 
counter the universal disrespect for the feminine and for women. Thus, the ultimate aim of 
this text is to denaturalize the idea that male domination was always peacefully accepted.  
As I am neither a Hellenist nor a specialist in Ancient Philosophy, this article will explore 
lines of research that have been carried out on the above-mentioned topic, suggesting some 
interpretations based on the state of the art.  
 
The sense and legitimacy of the quest for a conceptualization of the feminine and of 
women 
With the purpose of establishing the sense and legitimacy of this work from a feminist point 
of view, we might raise the following questions:  
 Is it worth plunging into the history of philosophy or the history of cultural ideas in 
search of roots?  
 Is it even possible and useful to do so, or will the androcentrism of our language 
perversely affect that research? 
Obviously, the fact that this text exists indicates that I shall answer both questions in the 
affirmative: nevertheless, it is not redundant to demonstrate how this is philosophically 
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consistent and militantly useful. Thus, I shall try to explain what separates me from positions 
that assert the absolute alterity of the female principle, such as that of Luce Irigaray for 
whom a project such as this of trying to re-signify some phases of the tradition is not merely 
irrelevant as downright prejudicial, because the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory 
of which woman will be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery 
itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and a meaning that are 
excessively univocal  I igaray, 1992: 126). This then, is about encountering in the theoretical 
a hi e  esou es that a  e ope atio alized. Fo  this, I ill use Gada e s 
hermeneutics, according to what Ricoeur translates as the effectiveness of the work of 
history, as a a  of ha a te isi g Gada e s pe spe ti e o  the su je t of histo i al 
consciousness, which makes it simultaneously a condition of possibility and a constraint on 
the way we interpret reality. For Gadamer, to have a historical sense is to measure our 
thought against our historical horizon, assuming our historical consciousness; in other 
words, it is to account for ourselves within the development of a process that contextualises 
us and to some extent shapes us. For this reason, it is our destiny to work on the history that 
works us.  
Gadamer calls the outcome of the historical work that we do about ourselves prejudice, 
by which he refers to that which could be characterised as schemata of trans-subjective 
signification, which function as principles for the reading of reality. These signification 
s he es ep ese t hat, i  Ka t s language, may be designated as the spectacles of the 
mind, constitutive of humanity, which confine us to an irreducible standpoint – not so much 
a form of relativism as the inevitable consequence of human finitude. We know reality and 
intervene in it through the conditions inherent in our being human: our insertion into a 
historical, social and cultural context, and the fact that we have a body, mean that any 
human discourse is an interpretation that is more or less validated by the premises and 
axioms into which it is inscribed. This perspective is directly opposed to the Western 
epistemological standard, according to which neutrality, universality and objectivity are 
considered necessary endowments for truth and knowledge, based on the idea of a pure, 
transparent and aseptic reason. Indeed, it points out that this knowledge is by no means 
unblemished or fingerprint-free; on the contrary, it encodes the blond hite a s ideolog , 
and only appears to be universally accepted because it is still the blond white male that is 
discursively dominant.  
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Amongst many critical positions, hermeneutic rationality also challenges this kind of 
epistemological positivism by showing that it is always connected to a particular human and 
cultural place, and that we are irremediably connected to the being or reality that we seek 
to u de sta d; he e, e a ot know the hole  e ause e a e in the hole  ‘i oeu , 
1950: 443). And although we have not given up seeking the universal, we no longer claim an 
a st a t u i e salit  ut athe  a  as ptoti  u i e salit  that a ks a di e tio , a 
egulato  ho izo  A o ós, : . The he e euti  positio , i  u de i i g the 
legitimacy of total rationality, brings to the field of knowledge the value of argumentation, 
o t i uti g to the eatio  of a ultu e of easo s 1 and to defend the need to seek out 
different sites from which reality may be comprehended and explained. If being can be said 
in many ways, it is important that all these interact together to enable a joint mode of 
speaking that can put an end to the discursive monolithism that masquerades as universal 
neutrality.2 It is in the context of the possibility and necessity of plural narratives that this 
o k fi ds its aiso  d´ t e, helpi g to ei fo e fe i is s self-awareness.  
Judy Chicago created her famous installation The Dinner Party to give shape to o e s 
heritage and o e s power. Similarly, all philosophical movements have sought for their 
roots and legitimacy in the history of philosophy. Feminist philosophy cannot avoid this rule; 
i deed, it is fo  this easo  that I i te d to use Gada e s ideas of histo i al o s ious ess 
to propose a different reading of the past, seeking to re-signify the idea that male 
domination was peacefully and universally accepted, and raising the hypothesis that this 
unquestioning acceptance was only apparent. This re-signification process may find support 
in the following words of Gadamer:  
Historical consciousness no longer listens sanctimoniously to the voice that reaches out from 
the past, but, in reflecting on it, replaces it within the context where it took root in order to 
see the significance and relative value proper to it. This reflexive posture towards tradition is 
called interpretation. (1979: 111; my italics) 
Thus, the fact of belonging to a time and culture implies that we have inherited a cluster 
of interpretative resources with which we orient ourselves as humans, as we have seen. 
However, this interpretation should entail a reflective behaviour towards our cultural 
                                                 
1
 Expression also used by Celia Amorós. 
2
 This hermeneutic rationality is situated between a modern and a postmodern rationality, taking from the 
former its discriminatory and analytical power and the value of formalization (while rejecting its totalizing and 
excluding stance), and from the latter, the recognition of finitude and the value of difference.  
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inheritance rather than a passive acceptance of it. I  othe  o ds, ha i g a histo i al se se  
obliges us to recognise the cultural legacy that we have received, but also obliges us to 
reassess it and reinterpret it, so as to reconfigure, with greater equity, the cultural 
inheritance that we in turn will bequeath.  
As regards representations of the feminine, the work of interpreting our cultural legacy is 
particularly delicate as it goes against that which most profoundly constitutes us. It has to 
start with deconstruction and a hermeneutics of suspicion, as the most deeply entrenched 
representations of the feminine come from an asymmetrical anthropological conception 
that takes the masculine as standard and the feminine as derivative.3 Following this 
approach, a reflective look at the Western tradition should allow itself to be oriented by the 
idea that male domination was not universally and peacefully accepted, but only appeared 
to be so. That is to say, re-signifying our common history, of men and women, obliges us to 
seek out the noises  that dis upt the universal acceptance of male domination, bringing to 
light signs of ambiguity and complexity in the power relations between the sexes, to which 
all eras have borne witness. Without this disclosure of such events, it will not be possible to 
trace out a new route for the understanding of our way of being, and we women will be left 
without female figures that materialize the possibility of looking at ourselves as full human 
beings. Moreover, if we passively accept the idea that male domination was always 
completely accepted, we are once more discriminating against our cultural heritage, because 
we are not doing justice to those that fought against that domination, thereby making their 
efforts invisible and reinforcing the cultural legacy that has managed to erase them.  
Such an interpretation of the Western tradition will reveal not only a way of conceiving 
the feminine and women that we might call canonical thought (which offers a negative, 
subaltern view of women and the feminine), but also counter currents of thought, or noises 
on the margins of dominant thought, which show that male domination has not always been 
peacefully accepted.  
 
Re-signifying old knowledges 
Philosophy, at the outset, spoke Greek, and was marked by rejection and rupture. It rejected 
a certain type of mythical and poetic knowledge and broke with the particular way of 
thinking that this implied. According to María Zambrano, philosophical discourse is an ethical 
                                                 
3
 On this subject, see Benoîte Groult (1993).  
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discourse as it corresponds to the desire of humans to construct their own knowledge, 
rather than accepting it from an external source.  
This dual situation of rejection and rupture led to a new way of thinking that determined 
the epistemological development of the western world. With that inheritance also came 
what I have called archetypal stereotypes, or foundational discriminations concerning the 
feminine and women, and these indelibly marked all subsequent anthropology, which 
developed different concepts but always involving an asymmetry between women and men. 
The historical effectiveness of that inheritance is so marked that Freud, who countered 
almost all modes of established thought, merely reiterated Aristotle on questions relating to 
the feminine and to women – for the castration complex and penis envy are no more than a 
recapitulation of the Aristotelian perspective, now raised to the status of scientific 
knowledge. In a othe  field of sig ifi atio , La a s idea that o l  the phallus has the 
capacity to evoke a specific symbolic field merely echoes what was instituted in Greece as 
the paradigm of the neutral universal, though it was in fact assimilated to the masculine.  
Greek philosophy is, thus, our inheritance and our destiny. To adopt it, within the 
framework of what has previously been said about the historical consciousness, necessarily 
requires that it be re-signified, as far as possible. To attempt this, I shall propose a series of 
guiding questions with their respective responses, which will serve to organize the second 
part of my text.  
Questions Answers 
What ideas inherited from Greece do we assume 
to be natural, not having reflected on their process 
of constitution? 
The idea of the neutral universal, and everything 
associated with it. 
 
What have we rejected outright? The Platonic proposal. 
What has been belittled or disparaged? 
The confirmed importance of some female figures, 
such as Sappho and Aspasia.  
What have we ignored or refused to accept as our 
inheritance? 
 
Some less usual aspects of Greek culture, if we 
take into account the depreciation of the feminine, 
for example: 
 The importance of the feminine in the 
transmission of knowledge – Hesiod (The 
Theogony) and Parmenides (Poem) 
 The importance of the female figure in the 
configuration of fundamental questions 
concerning the human condition, as testified by 
the tragedies.  
 Plato s u e pe ted p oposal o e i g the 
possibility of philosopher queens and the 
examples from Lysistrata, The Assembly of 
Women and Melanippe, the Philosopher  
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                      Philosophical Conceptions and Representations of the Feminine 
74 
Since it is impossible to explore all these aspects within the limits of this particular text, I 
shall focus only on four, chosen for being particularly well known, unusual, paradigmatic or 
influential. These are:  
 The question of the neutral universal 
 The Plato controversy 
 The cases of Sappho and Aspasia 
 The symbolic dimension of three unusual plays 
 
Neutral Universal/False Neutral 
Celia Amorós, in her introduction to an anthology of studies on the conceptualization of the 
feminine in Greek philosophy, claims that, from the outset, there was an ideological 
conceptualization of the feminine that counterposed it to a supposed neutral universal. On 
this subject, she makes two important points:  
a. […] that hi h is thought as ei g ge e i all  hu a  is p ese ted o  a  a st a t pla e that 
eut alizes se ual opposites […]. However, this does not mean that what is proposed on the 
level of the abstraction of the neutral can be communicable in the masculine or feminine: it 
will constitute itself as masculine, thereby assuming the neutral, and thus not positioning 
itself as masculine but as the generic human itself. […] 
b. By being placed on the side of what is different, the other-that-is-different-from-the-neutral, 
and as the neutral is what is thought of as neutral – in the same way that it becomes 
neutral in the process of being thought – the feminine becomes the unthought. (Amorós, 
1994: vii)  
I shall explore this dual claim – the suppression of the process of assimilation of the 
neutral universal and the masculine, and the transformation of the unthought feminine into 
the unthinkable – usi g )a a o s pe spe ti e o  the o igi s of G eek philosoph , 
particularly the direct connection that she makes between philosophy and violence 
(Zambrano, 1991). Focusing on Plato and Aristotle, and within the framework of a 
comparison between philosophy and poetry, Zambrano calls the philosophical attitude an 
ecstasy failed by a schism because the philosopher, who initially experiences ecstasy before 
the awe-inspiring nature of reality (unlike the poet, who loses himself in it), ultimately 
abandons it, and abstracts from it in order to acquire an understanding of its essence 
through this ascetic distancing. The image that Zambrano gives us of the origin of philosophy 
shows that the philosophical desire is for the unity or totalization of knowledge. From her 
point of view, this desire for a unified whole becomes an obsession and pursues philosophy 
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like a phantom. To utter the human word about reality (instead of the divine word of mythic 
poetry) means for the philosopher uttering the last word, absolute and pure, and thus 
philosophy entails a dual violence: the separation from the primary awe at reality and the 
imposition of an all-inclusive order on that same reality. Within this interpretation, 
Zambrano claims that, in the Greek world, philosophical thought could have developed in 
two distinct ways – one connected to a temporal logos (the Pythagorean way of number and 
music) and another connected to a spatial logos (of word and being).4  
The temporal logos privileges both word and silence, giving emphasis to rhythm and time 
as ealit s ode of ei g. If this fo  of thi ki g had t iu phed, philosophi al easo  
would have had to find another way of expressing itself. However, it was the Aristotelian 
logos, which defined and judged all things, that prevailed. With this victory, unity, clarity and 
luminosity gained the upper hand, and the abstract and supposedly neutral universal was 
established as a supreme value. However, it is useful to understand how Aristotle, the victor, 
defined the Universal on the anthropological and political plane.  
I  a o k o  this su je t, A pa o Mo e o sepa ates se is  f o  a d o e t is  i  
order to show that the concept of supposedly universal man i he ited f o  A istotle s 
Politics not only excludes women, but also many men. She claims that the concept of man 
that Aristotle forged, particularly in Book I of his Politics, refers to the aner-andros, i.e. to 
the made man, who has assumed the values proper to virility and thereby believes that he 
has the right to rule over othe  e  a d o e  (Moreno, 1988: 18).  
Analysing important academic works that comment on and disseminate the Aristotelian 
perspective, Amparo Moreno shows that, in the transmission of Aristotelian thought, 
A istotle s efe e es to o e , sla es a d fo eig e s are minimized or completely ignored, 
or, in some cases, only his position on slavery is mentioned. While serving the idea of a 
neutral universal, this selective transmission in fact ignores the discriminatory significance 
that the meanings of the concept originally had; because although Aristotle knew to whom 
his concept applied and which men could be citizens of his polis, we (the whole of the 
western world) use the word man to refer to humanity, thereby eliding the segregational 
dimension that the term originally had. This gives public and academic discourse what 
Moreno calls an androcentric opacity. In other words, we have relegated to the plane of the 
unthought the conditions that created the concept, and in doing so, have naturalized it, 
                                                 
4
 I have developed this idea in previous texts (Henriques, 1998a, 2001).  
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stripping it of its constructed character, and presenting it as being itself a neutral universal, 
contributing to the dissemination of an idea of humanity as virile, combative, dominating 
and property-owning.  
The i po ta e of this pe spe ti e is o e ted to the ulti ate pu pose of A istotle s 
Politics: to naturalize a particular state of affairs by showing that the polis represented the 
atu al ode of olle ti e o ga izatio . Fo  this easo , A istotle used the atu e of thi gs  
to legitimise those that had the power to command and those that had, naturally, to be 
commanded. Thus, he says at the beginning of Book I of the Politics that nature created 
some beings to command and others to obey, emphasising that everyone would gain 
through this. This perspective served the West for many centuries, legitimizing slavery. We 
may ask if it still serves today to keep women away from public life and deprive them of full 
and inclusive citizenship. It has certainly influenced other ideas that have prevailed, such as 
those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for whom the place of wo e  a o di g to the atu e of 
thi gs  as lea :  
In the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same 
way. […] O e ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak. One must necessarily 
will and be able; it suffices that the other put up little resistance.  
Once this principle is established, it follows that woman was made specially to please man. 
(2010: 532)  
There are many other examples like this that show that, when the will exists to establish the 
superiority of one sector of humanity over another, there is always a tendency to ground it 
i  a gu e ts o e i g the atu e of thi gs.  This is why it is crucial for feminist thought − 
or indeed any other form of thought that aims at justice − to lay bare the constructed nature 
and the o te t of o st u tio  of all that p ese ts itself as atu al.  I  fa t, the ke word 
for non-discriminatory thought of any type should be de atu alizatio .  Particularly in 
relation to the idea of the neutral universal, such denaturalization is absolutely essential.  
 
The non-acceptance of the Platonic proposal for the Just City 
The o ultatio  of the o te t u de l i g A istotle s idea of the citizen-man may have been 
partly responsible for the re eptio  of Plato s p oposal i  the Republic that women could 
also govern the city and become philosopher queens.  
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Plato has two works on social and political organization: the Republic and the Laws.5 In 
the first, he argues that, although men as a group are superior to women, there are many 
women that are better than many men; for this reason, women should be given the chance 
to benefit from an education that could turn them into potential city governors. In the light 
of his notion that only practising philosophers could govern wisely, this proposal in the 
Republic implies that women (or at least some women) could arrive at the pinnacle of 
knowledge, as represented by philosophy, thereby enabling them to be queens of the just 
city. Even in utopian terms, it does not seem irrelevant that this idea once arose in Greece 
and that it is the object of debate in one of the best known works of western philosophy.  
However, it so happened that, while Western culture accepted this work as important, it 
excluded the part about women accessing the heights of knowledge and power, considering 
it idi ulous, u easo a le o  agai st atu e.  Natalie Bluestone (1987: 21-73) analysed 
how this issue was received by the academy between 1870 and 1970 and identified seven 
types of hostility in relation to the Platonic proposal, of which I shall highlight the following 
four:  
 Equality is a non-issue (i.e. devaluation of the proposal) 
 Women are different (i.e. the proposal is against nature) 
 Women have better things to do (i.e. the proposal is undesirable) 
 Plato did not really mean that (i.e. the proposal is unintentional, unwelcome or 
comic) 
I do not believe that scholars can remain indifferent before such arguments for not 
accepting a theoretical proposal. And I believe, moreover, that this hostility is likely to have 
had a decisive historical effectiveness in the formation of our collective consciousness, to the 
extent that it still operates today as a preconscious schema in the minds of those that have 
doubts about parity or about the value of quotas as a process of positive discrimination.  
The rupture that Bluestone identifies in her analysis of the reception of the Platonic 
proposal in the 1970s is related, as we might expect, with the cultural and epistemological 
e olutio  that o u ed i  the s a d s, which in one way or another had 
repercussions upon the academy. However, although the reception of this issue seemed to 
change after that date, Bluestone points to the persistence of the stereotype, particularly in 
                                                 
5
 On this question see, for example, Julie K. Ward (1996); Sister Prudence Allen (1985); Claude Mossé (1983). 
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readings such as that of Allan Bloom, which continue to propagate an eminently sexist 
interpretation of the Platonic proposal (Bluestone, 1987: 154 ff.). Bluesto e s a al ti  
framework makes it clear that it is the reception of Plato that continues to erase the 
meaning and pertinence of his proposal; despite o side i g o e  as falle  souls,  Plato 
was nevertheless able to conceptualize the feminine without taking it as a collective, and 
thus, to conceive of the possibility that at least some women could rise to become governors 
of the city.  
Without ishi g to ake Plato a defe de  of o e s ights, e should e a a e of 
what is at stake in the Platonic proposal: a rational argument in favour of the human right 
and philosophical legitimacy of women being able to rise to the highest form of knowledge 
and, consequently, to the highest rank of power. If we take into account that even today 
those rights are not peacefully accepted by all, we can glean some sense of the extent of 
Plato s daring.  
 
The belittling, denigration and disparagement of the notable women of the Ancient World  
In its guise as neutral universal, androcentism is also likely to have been an important factor 
i  the sile i g o  elittli g of o e . Ho e e , despite o e s ge e al i isi ilit , it as 
not possible to make them completely disappear from the history of ideas and culture. The 
cases of Sappho and Aspasia may be taken as the paradigm of the (deliberate or 
unconscious) occultation of the feminine, letting us believe that women were always 
confined to the gynecaeum and that male domination was universal, uncontroversial and i  
accordance with the nature of things.   
The reception of Sappho and Aspasia was, in both cases, connected to sexuality; however, 
there are differences between them that have to do with their personal history and the 
topics for which they became important.  
For most people today, two associations immediately spring to mind when we think of 
Sappho: her identification with the tenth muse and her lesbianism. However, these have 
nothing to do with the specific qualities that made her impossible to erase from history, 
namely the fact that she was one of the greatest poets of all times. As far as we know, 
Sappho was from the city of Mytilene on Lesbos, and lived between the second half of the 
7
th
 century and the first decades of the 6
th
 century BC. This makes her slightly later than 
Hesiod and Simonides – poets whose views of the feminine were not the most positive.  
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A o di g to spe ialist studies, the i fo atio  a out “appho s life is so o t adi to  
that the most reliable details may be gleaned from her own oeuvre. From this, we learn that 
she was responsible for herself and for her family circle, and was far removed from the 
received idea of the Greek woman, confined to the home and kept under guardianship 
(Iriarte, 1997). One of the prejudices that the reception of Sappho s poet  see s to ha e 
been unable to overcome was the categorisation of her poetry as exclusively concerned with 
the inner world; indeed, she is frequently accused of a cloistered sentimentality centred 
upon a self-contemplative Eros, in contrast with the political awareness shown by Alcaeus, 
her contemporary and compatriot, who sang of war and the active life. As some studies 
point out, this preconception has had the effect of turning Sappho herself into a symbolic 
figure, relegating her to the plane of the di i e a d ide tif i g he  as the o tal use.   
The othe  p e o eptio  o e s “appho s o  life a d he  identification with 
lesbianism (the term of course derives from her native island). This idea indicates the 
ideological framework in which women are conceptualized; for while it was common in 
Greece for teachers to have relations of this nature with their (same-sex) students, in her 
case it became her defining feature. We might note that the same did not occur with other 
distinguished figures of Greece, such as Socrates (who is never characterised first and 
foremost by his passion for Alcibiades);6 for, in the context of Western morality and 
worldview, linking an eminent person with homosexuality was a way of denigrating them, 
thereby obscuring their value. Thus, the reception of Sappho offers a prototype of how 
female figures were mythically represented, as either divine or evil.  
As for Aspasia,7 most people that know her name remember her as the mistress of 
Pericles. They will also know that she had great influence over him, especially negatively. 
However, what they probably do not know is that Aspasia belonged to an elite intellectual 
circle in Athens, and that she took active part in debates there alongside the famous men 
that also formed part of the group. This shows there were other roles for women in Athens 
esides that of the faithful su issi e ife of a  Athe ia  itize , p ote ti g the fa il s 
honour and property through her fidelity and submission. Thus, in the case of Aspasia, we 
find the same ideological interpretation operating as we found with Sappho. That is to say, 
                                                 
6
 If the differentiating circumstance is the fact that Socrates was married, we should remember that Sappho 
was also said to have a husband and daughter, and that, moreover, she composed epithalamiums (songs 
celebrating marriage).  
7
 On Aspasia, see, for example, Mary E. Waithe (1992); Amalia G. Suárez (1997); José S. Dueso (1994).  
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when it is not possible to ignore women, then the aspect of them that is least prestigious is 
presented first and foremost, in the light of a morality that is also supposedly neutral.  
The introduction to the bilingual edition of a work on Aspasia ends on a note that is 
pertinent for my purposes here:  
 [T]he information Plato gives about Aspasia corresponds to the historical reality. I consider 
that this is the best h pothesis to e plai  hat the iti s epeatedl  all the ste  o  
e ig a  of Me e e us. The easo  hy the vast majority of modern authors, and some 
ancient ones, not only refused to accept this hypothesis but also did not consider it worthy of 
study is another question that raises important issues for the ideological history of the West. 
(Dueso, 1994: xl-xli)  
Interestingly, it is once again the reception of Plato that is at the heart of this controversy. 
In this case, we are dealing with the Platonic dialogue Menexenus, where Aspasia is 
described as a master of rhetoric and author of speeches. According to Mary E. Waithe 
(1992), commentators on this work can be divided into two large groups: those that consider 
that the Menexenus belongs to the Platonic oeuvre, but that it is his only non-philosophical 
work (which effectively belittles it); and those that consider that the references it contains to 
Aspasia were made by Aspasia herself, and that Plato included them because he recognised 
her reputation as a philosopher/rhetorician, and wanted to make clear that he disapproved 
of the influence that philosophers like her had in Greece.  
For Dueso, ho elo gs to this se o d g oup, Plato s efe e es to Aspasia de o st ate 
the importance that she would have had in those circles. Indeed, this author points out that, 
in refusing to accept the factual basis of what Plato says about Aspasia, scholars are 
employing different criteria to those used for the reception of other figures from his works, 
such as Lysias (in Phaedrus), Gorgias and Protagoras.  
I  his stud  of Aspasia, Dueso olle ted  testi o ies,  of hi h efe  to Aspasia s 
rhetorical expertise and others that connect her to philosophy; thus, he believes it is 
absolutely legitimate to consider that Aspasia was connected to philosophy and to the art of 
argumentation, claiming that her trial for impiety illustrates her importance and intellectual 
influence. Dueso also raises the hypothesis that a movement of female emancipation may 
have developed around Pericles and his circle, which might help explain not only the trial, 
but also comedies such as Lysistrata and The Assembly of Women.  
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Some peculiarities of Greek culture  
This reference to Lysistrata and The Assembly of Women leads conveniently to the last point 
I wish to make in this paper, involving the analysis of some of the less usual aspects of the 
Greek legacy. In particular, I will focus upon three plays (two comedies and one tragedy) 
where women are protagonists in situations that would be completely unlikely within the 
framework of the dominant conceptualization of the feminine.  
However, to legitimise this incursion into the poetic, I shall call to my defence the words 
that open the second part of the work La Femme dans la Grèce antique:  
The knowledge of a society does not consist simply in establishing legal, social and economic facts. A 
society is often revealed much more sharply through the image that it has and conveys of itself than 
through statistics or laws, however reliable they might be. […] Co se ue tl , a stud  of o e  i  
Greece involves updating the images that the Greeks themselves created and defined in epic, lyric 
poetry, and tragic and comic theatre, without overlooking the works of the philosophers and the 
narratives of the historians. (Mossé, 1991: 93)  
Although I do not agree with the conclusions that this author draws from her analysis, I 
do share her starting point with regard to the importance of what might be called social 
imaginary, so effectively transmitted by literature and theatre. Thus, any discussion of 
o e s ole i  G eek so iet  needs to take account of the importance of female figures in 
Greek theatre as vehicles for the consideration of fundamental philosophical problems.  
In a groundbreaking work of feminist theology (In Memory of Her, 1983), Elisabeth 
Fiorenza, a specialist in New Testament exegesis, reconstructs the history of the origins of 
Christianity in the global social context in which it emerged, i.e. its Sitz im Leben. By revealing 
the social, cultural and ideological conditions underpinning the production of the Biblical 
texts, she situates them in time, thereby separating the historical and the symbolic 
dimensions.  
To my mind, Greek theatre requires the opposite reflective operation in order to make 
visible a contradiction between its Sitz im Leben and the role of women in the textual 
testimonies that have come down to us, and the symbolic function of that contradiction 
needs to be explored. Thus, Greek theatre should be analysed within its (strongly 
patriarchal) Sitz im Leben, in order to at least raise the hypothesis that there might have 
been noises on the margins of the dominant thought, that not everyone thought in the same 
way and that, therefore, male domination was not peacefully accepted.  
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From the complex of questions that arises in this context, I would like to highlight two 
situations that would seem to be exemplary:  
 The connection of women to fundamental social issues, such as peace and the 
organization of collective life, as is the case of Lysistrata and The Assembly of 
Women;8  
 The totally atypical existence of a play entitled Melanippe, the Philosopher. 
Claude Moss s stud , e tio ed a o e, does not give any political significance to the 
two comedies by Aristophanes, considering that both Lysistrata and The Assembly of Women 
only depict female figures that have all the characteristics traditionally ascribed to women 
(particularly the negative ones), and that the issues that are raised pertain strictly to the 
female worldview.9 As we have already seen, Dueso suggests another reading: that these 
comedies might have echoed a real-life protest  o e  i  the o te t of Pe i les  i le.  
Although I am not in a position to settle this interpretative dispute, it does strike me as 
remarkable that Aristophanes created a plot in which female protagonists suggest political 
solutions in times of crisis, and that, in both cases, those female figures managed to mobilise 
and organise themselves in such a way as to occupy the public space which theoretically was 
forbidden to them. Whatever one wishes to think, only one of two hypotheses is possible 
here: either Aristophanes dreamed up the situation that he staged (which means that he 
implicitly acknowledged the possibility that women could perform such roles) or he was 
echoing others that did think in that way. Whichever, it is remarkable that such an image of 
female strength and power, with the capacity for mobilization and public action, was staged 
and applauded in Greece in the 5th century BC. What is more, although the solutions 
suggested by the women seemed to originate from their own experience and worldview, 
this can only be perceived as negative if those solutions are assessed from an exclusively 
male vantage point. Yet, in both examples, the so-called male solutions had been exhausted 
and had led to chaos, making it legitimate to seek alternatives.  
                                                 
8
 Lysistrata (411 BC) is set during the resurgence of the war between Athens and Sparta. The Athenian 
Lysistrata summons the women of Greece to mobilise and put an end to the war by going on a sex strike. In The 
Assembly of Women, the Athenian women disguise themselves as men, and their leader, Praxagora, takes 
control, establishing a communist regime.  
9
 In the case of Lysistrata, the women suggest epla i g eapo s ith distaffs a d spi dles. Ho e e ,  the 
autho  adds, the th century Athenian spectator knew very well that at the end everything would return to 
normality, that the topsy-turvy world would eventually be righted and that the women would once more find 
their way ho e  116). In The Assembly Women, the protagonists conceive the life of the city in terms of a 
giant household (oikos), and therefore do not ever get beyond the female imaginary.  
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Melanippe, the Philosopher is the title of a tragedy by Euripides of which only fragments 
have survived. As the title indicates, the play focuses on a woman philosopher, or at least a 
woman that philosophises. The story is as follows. Seduced by Poseidon, Melanippe bears 
twin boys. Afraid of her father Aeolus, and upon the orders of the god, she hides her sons in 
a stable. However, the twins are discovered and taken to Aeolus, who considers them 
monsters and condemns them to be burned alive. Melanippe intervenes, and uses rational 
arguments to demonstrate that the children cannot be monsters and must have had a 
human mother. She finally acknowledges that she herself is the mother, at which her father 
blinds her and shuts her away. However, 16 years later, she is released by her sons and 
father, and recovers her sight.  
Séverine Auffret (1988) has carried out a study of this work, making the following points:  
 The p otago ist s a e, Melanippe, which is related to black mare, is interpreted as 
referring to the feminine and tragic side of the centaur Chiron, considered to be the 
ancestor of the philosophers for having gained dominion over brute strength through 
the power of the spirit. For Auffret, the tragedy of Melanippe stages not only the 
Greek situation but also the whole paradigm of the relationship between women and 
philosophy – they are always excluded from it and operate at its margins. In this 
respect, she evokes the work of Gilles Ménage, Historia mullierum philosopharum, 
which identifies 65 female philosophers, thus proving that it is in the reception and 
dissemination of o e s thought that the o ultatio  of this i he ita e o u s, 
thereby obstructing its historical effectiveness.  
 In the ambit of this occultation or de-legitimatio , Auff et e tio s A istotle s 
comment in the Poetics that Melanippe is an example of theatrical bad taste; this is 
because its protagonist is inappropriate, as it is implausible that a young woman would 
develop philosophical discourse to this extent.  
 Fi all , poi ti g out that the t aged  e ds happil , despite Mela ippe s 
philosophising, Auffret suggests that Euripides may have wanted to focus on the 
prohibition against women philosophers and on the reasons that led them to engage 
in that practice.  
Even without going into the anachronistic question of whether Euripides might have been 
displaying pre-feminist impulses, we cannot ignore that he wrote this play and that the 
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situation described in it must have had some significance with regard to the representation 
of women and their capacities in the Greek world.  
 
Conclusion 
Although this is only a very brief introduction to what is a very vast subject, I have suggested 
that the conventional perspective on women in Ancient Greece (which depicts them as 
wholly subordinate to men and culturally irrelevant) does not tell the complete story. A 
more systematic in-depth survey will certainly show a greater range of perspectives on this 
topic, uncovering a new list of names beyond those that are well known from the canonical 
literature. Thus, further work needs to be done in the field of Greek philosophy and culture 
in order to uncover some of the possibilities that were not developed in the past, thereby 
enabling us to narrate our own roots in a different way.  
Translated by Karen Bennett 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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